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POST-STALIN SHAKE-UP IN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY Page 16

Since Stalin's death a Soviet Foreign Ministry shake-up affecting almost 70 percent of the top posts has taken place. The principal aim appears to be revitalization of Soviet diplomacy rather than a foreign service purge.

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THE SOVIET WORLD

Hints of Soviet strategy at the Berlin conference have emerged [redacted]

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[redacted] The Russians argued strongly that the problem of European security is one which can be solved by European states through bilateral nonaggression treaties.

They also suggested that the Kremlin might accept free elections in Germany at the price of neutralization and the establishment of a government like that in Austria. Recent Soviet propaganda, however, indicates continued inflexible opposition to the Western concept of free elections under foreign supervision.

Foreign Minister Molotov stressed the need for European security in an interview on 12 January with French ambassador Joxe in Moscow. He emphasized that the German problem was the key to European security but shed no new light on Soviet security proposals.

Similarly, a note to Austria on 16 January failed to clarify Soviet plans for an Austrian settlement at Berlin. While the vaguely worded note supported the principle of a treaty settlement with Austrian participation, it gave no specific commitment to take up or settle the issue now.

On Far Eastern issues the Communist world is intensifying its campaign to overcome the psychological and political defeat represented by the release of the unrepatriated prisoners in Korea. The Communists apparently hope to inject enough confusion and doubt into the repatriation question to deprive the West of the full impact of its victory on the nonforcible repatriation principle and to generate strong pressure for renewed UN debate on the Korean issue.

The attack is being conducted on three main fronts. The major attention is now being devoted to an attempt to prove that the UN decision to release the prisoners on 23 January, allegedly to avoid completion of the explanations, violates the armistice agreement.

Secondary attention is given to demonstrating a genuine interest in resuming the preliminary talks at Panmunjom for arranging the political conference. The Communists contrast their alleged willingness to resume talks without conditions with the "arbitrary conditions" raised by the US to block resumption.

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These first two lines of attack are used to support demands for the early resumption of UN debate on Korea. On 14 January, Vyshinsky formally approved reconvening the 8th General Assembly to consider the Korean question, but he argued that "bearing in mind the situation in Panmunjom," the assembly should meet on 22 January rather than on 9 February as suggested by Madame Pandit. Moscow radio warned on 15 January that the UN must "take into its hands the peaceful settlement of the Korean question."

Finally, this Communist campaign is also linked with Soviet objectives at the forthcoming Berlin conference. Molotov will probably attempt to use the widespread concern over the failure to reach a Korean settlement as support for his demands for a five-power conference to discuss reduction of international tensions. Moscow radio has warned that it will be impossible to solve the Korean problem without Communist Chinese and North Korean participation, and Chou En-lai has endorsed Moscow's proposal for a five-power conference.

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WESTERN HANDICAPS IN THE BERLIN TALKS

The three Allied powers approach the Berlin conference handicapped by the strength of the widespread desire for a relaxation of East-West tensions and also by specific political considerations in several Western European countries. Britain seems fully determined to pay no excessive price for such a detente, but in France, West Germany, and Austria special national objectives make the governments vulnerable in varying degrees to possible Soviet overtures and pose potentially serious difficulties for the three Allied foreign ministers.

For France the most sensitive issue is the Indochina war. Communist diplomatic hints and propaganda approaches to France have for some months capitalized on the growing desire to shed this burden; and Vice Premier Reynaud reiterated in the last fortnight that France must seek a suitable five-power conference with this end in view. Other members of the cabinet have called for ending the war on any terms short of outright withdrawal, and no French government can at present refuse to give serious attention to any Soviet proposals on Indochina.

On European security questions, France's present indecision springs mainly from unwillingness to make room for a resurgent Germany in the European and Atlantic communities. Most Frenchmen have lost their fear of Soviet aggression in the near future, but do fear that a unified and rearmed Germany would relegate France to a secondary role and eventually lead the West into war to regain Germany's lost eastern provinces. Consequently, they are likely to look with sympathy on any Soviet proposals for a disarmed or neutralized Germany.

French representatives might well be susceptible to a Soviet "package deal" accepting a major Western demand such as free all-German elections, but coupling such acceptance with limitations on Germany's future armaments and alliances. In particular, the French would be attracted by a Continent-wide security guarantee implying restrictions on Germany's freedom of action.

In West Germany, where progress toward unification remains the primary demand on the Berlin negotiators, there is still agreement among all political parties that free elections are a prerequisite for unification. The belief is growing both in parliament and the press, however, that the USSR

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has legitimate grounds for assuring its own military security before relinquishing East Germany and withdrawing its occupation forces. It is likely, therefore, that many West Germans would consider it entirely reasonable for Moscow to insist on some kind of agreement on the status of a united Germany before agreeing to free elections, and many also would still accept neutrality as the price of free elections.

Sharp resentment would probably be aroused in West Germany if the Allies tried to terminate the conference at an early date because of Soviet refusal to agree on specific arrangements for free elections after Moscow had previously accepted the principle. Chancellor Adenauer's government, however, can be counted on to oppose any Soviet efforts to protract the conference, provided that initial Soviet concessions cause no great surge of unification sentiment.

West German opinion also is vulnerable to any possible conciliatory Soviet gestures early in the conference on secondary issues such as the status of Berlin or East-West trade. Interest is increasing in the Federal Republic in expanding trade relations with the Orbit as a hedge against threatened economic recession; and any Communist gestures on this or similar matters would be taken by many West Germans as evidence that concessions on more important issues were possible.

Austria's growing insistence on obtaining a state treaty at almost any cost constitutes still another potential handicap for the Allied negotiators. The Austrian government indicated to the American ambassador on 14 January that, if permitted to state its case at Berlin, it would adhere to the agreed Western position. It would be prepared, however, to abjure all military alliances and even assume the burden of reparations specified in the present version of the treaty's Article 35.

Allied failure to let Vienna accept Soviet terms it considered bearable would have serious repercussions in Austria. Austrian acceptance of such terms, on the other hand, might cause West German opinion to blame its own failure to achieve a treaty on "obstructionism" by Adenauer and the occupying powers.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DJILAS AFFAIR

The fall from power of Milovan Djilas, one of the four top Yugoslav party leaders, represents the first serious rupture within the top echelon of the Yugoslav party since 1948. The dispute appears to have been purely internal, and there is no evidence that Yugoslavia's international orientation and foreign policy are involved. Although a purge of some Djilas supporters can be expected to follow, it is unlikely to weaken the stability of the Tito regime or to involve other top-level personalities.

The solidarity which has hitherto characterized the tightly knit Tito clique, the suddenness with which the present crisis developed, and the special attention given Djilas' attack on the corruptive influences of bureaucratic authority suggest that personal differences as well as disagreements on the form and timing of party policy were responsible for sparking the Djilas dispute. The personal factor remains an "unknown," however, and no further light was thrown on the subject during the central committee discussions on 16 and 17 January.

According to charges by the Yugoslav central committee, the views expressed by Djilas in a recent series of articles were "basically contrary to the spirit" of the decisions reached by the Sixth Party Congress in November 1952. These decisions stipulated that the party's position of leadership, its Communist identity, and the organizational principle of "democratic centralism" were to remain unimpaired, but that Communists were no longer to be considered "an exclusive part of the working class" or to claim for themselves a monopoly in the creation of socialism.

The obscurity and lack of definition of this new line immediately gave rise to considerable confusion within the party, and contributed to a highly flexible interpretation of party policies on the part of Yugoslav leaders. While it is true that Djilas has been more specific than other Yugoslav leaders in his criticism of "bureaucracy," corruption, and "outmoded forms," he has heretofore been a faithful exponent of the party line, and it was not until late in December that any ideological deviation became apparent in his articles.

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It became clear during the discussions of the central committee on 16 and 17 January, however, that Djilas had violated party discipline by publicly airing his personal interpretation of the party platform, and that he had incurred the wrath of other party leaders by interpreting that platform too broadly. Particularly objectionable were Djilas' advocacy of a smaller party organization, his suggestion that the party's basic organizations be abandoned, his proposal that some state organs be "emancipated from every influence of the party," and his attack on "the quite real monstrosity" and "fancied superior morals" of the "closed circle" of party bureaucracy.

Although he clearly noted that "the struggle for democracy must still be headed by the experienced Communist cadres," Djilas' articles were understandably interpreted in Belgrade as a threat to the authority and prestige of the party leadership. The resulting attack on him may involve a return to a purer communist doctrine and lead to further attacks on "bourgeois liberalist forms" and the "formalistic, Western type of democracy," but there is no indication that it will result in a weakening of Yugoslavia's political, economic and military ties with the West. Tito has emphasized that the matter is a purely internal one, and that "it cannot influence the course of our foreign policy."

There are indications, however, that Djilas' censure reflects a certain "tightening-up" in Yugoslav domestic policies and party discipline. In any case, a review and clarification of the Sixth Congress line is long overdue, and the Djilas case is already being used as the basis for a strong reassertion of the mission and solidarity of the party.

Although it has been announced that a new plenary session of the central committee will meet in six weeks to reassess the decisions of the Sixth Congress, there has as yet been no indication that Yugoslav policies will be basically changed. On 17 January Tito warned that the Communist Party should not make "new mistakes" by "going to the other extreme" as a result of the Djilas affair, but should continue to follow in its present path with greater vigilance and care "to avoid saying later that we have again been blind."

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FACTIONALISM EXPECTED TO WEAKEN NEW IRANIAN PARLIAMENT

The elections now under way in Iran will probably give Prime Minister Zahedi temporary control of the new Majlis, which, however, is expected to split quickly into the usual cliques based on special and personal interests. These groups may often oppose Zahedi's policies and their votes on his program will be unpredictable. Any reappearance of pro-British deputies will also increase parliamentary disputes.

Contrary to an earlier official announcement that the elections would be completed within 24 hours, it now appears that the balloting will be spread over several weeks. This increases the government's chances for success in manipulating the voting. Zahedi and the shah are making strong efforts to influence the elections despite Zahedi's illness, which has kept him inactive for the past week. Although they reportedly disagree over certain candidates, they are supporting a joint list.

Zahedi recently said that he expected 40 of the 136 candidates backed by the government to support him fully, while 40 more would be friendly to the government but could not be depended on in times of stress. The prime minister believes the remainder would in general support the government, except for perhaps a half dozen troublesome demagogues.

The caliber of the candidates offers little hope that the new Majlis will be an improvement over earlier ones. Many of those backed by the government were chosen more for their friendship for the shah or Zahedi than for ability and honesty. Several are obviously being rewarded for past political support of the regime, although their reputations are poor. Men such as Zahedi's former deputy prime ministers Amidi-Nuri and Dowlatabadi are considered thoroughly corrupt opportunists.

There will probably be the traditionally large majority of deputies representing the entrenched landowning and tribal interests, with a scattering of representatives from the professions, lawyers, journalists, clerics, and the military. Some opposition deputies may be elected, although there seems to be little coordination between the various opposition groups. Mozaffar Baghai, chief non-Communist opponent of Zahedi, apparently is trying to win election from Kerman, a district which twice before sent him to Tehran. The shah and Zahedi in turn reportedly have decided to delay the Kerman elections in an attempt to block Baghai.

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The first test of Zahedi's control will come immediately after the Majlis is formed, when it is customary to give the prime minister a vote of confidence after hearing his program. He probably will win this initial vote but is likely to run into difficulties soon afterward. Iran needs, and nearly every government including the present one has promised, financial, social and economic reforms. The attempted reforms always meet opposition from those groups in the Majlis whose special interests might be prejudiced by the action.

The government will therefore probably have very unpredictable backing. Zahedi might receive a vote of no-confidence on any one of a dozen issues ranging from his handling of the oil negotiations with Britain to much-needed tax reforms. His support will almost certainly fade away if he is unsuccessful in his internal economic program and in his negotiations with Britain.

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BURMA FACES SERIOUS ARMS SUPPLY PROBLEM

Burma's decision not to renew the defense treaty with Britain which expired on 4 January leaves its armed forces with no regular source of supply. The Burmese reached this decision largely because they felt that the agreement was incompatible with national sovereignty, and that Britain had exploited its position and interfered in domestic affairs. As a result, Burma's capability to meet the threat of Communists and other insurgents in all likelihood will deteriorate.

British arms will continue to be sold to Burma, but there are indications that unless a new relationship can be worked out, London will accord future Burmese requests a lower priority than heretofore. While negotiations for a new agreement are continuing, the American army attaché in Rangoon reports that an early settlement is unlikely and that the British mission is planning to phase out its activities as rapidly as possible.

Burma's need for military equipment, meanwhile, is becoming acute. Little of the materiel which the British turned over to the armed forces in 1948, when the country became independent, is still usable, and subsequent deliveries have satisfied only immediate operational requirements. Thus even a slowdown in the transmission of arms will handicap military efforts to suppress the Communists and other insurgent groups, and to put pressure on the Chinese Nationalist forces in northeast Burma.

To avoid dependence on Britain, the Burmese have long sought to buy arms in continental Europe, Asia, and the United States, and odd lots of small arms are known to have been purchased from France and Italy. Such purchases, however, besides failing to satisfy Burma's needs, cause serious maintenance problems due to lack of standardization and an irregular flow of spare parts.

According to the American embassy in Rangoon, Burmese officials are irritated by their failure, to date, to obtain arms from the United States. The Burmese commander in chief in December told the American army attaché, with whom he has been friendly, that he did not trust Washington and indicated that he was resigned to getting along without American arms. The embassy fears that the Burmese may turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance if they continue to be frustrated in their procurement efforts, and has recommended that they be given \$10,000,000 worth of selected military items or that such equipment be made available at extremely liberal prices.

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There is no evidence that the Burmese are now seeking arms in the Communist world. However, should the current trade negotiations with the Communists concerning the disposal of large surplus rice stocks prove satisfactory, it is quite possible the Burmese will seek to solve their arms problem in a similar manner.

Although the Orbit is capable of exporting a wide range of military equipment, to do so would constitute a sharp departure from past policy.

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PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

Since his inauguration on 30 December, President Ramon Magsaysay has moved rapidly toward reorganizing the Philippine government along more efficient lines and his announced policies have met with enthusiastic popular response. The chief obstacle to his success appears to lie in the possible undermining of his program by conservative elements within his own Nacionalista Party.

In his inaugural address, Magsaysay called for a re-examination of the feudal land tenure system, for a wider distribution of the benefits of economic development, and for administrative and judicial reforms. Since then he has instituted a major reorganization of several government economic agencies and corporations. He has also ordered the armed forces to help in conducting a census of land ownership and in a large road construction project which is probably beyond Philippine financial and technical capabilities.

These moves are in keeping with Magsaysay's election campaign, which for the first time gave the Philippine masses a feeling of personal contact with the government. After the inauguration they overwhelmed the president's office in response to an invitation to send in by collect telegram any complaints they had about the government. There is little doubt that they confidently expect a thorough overhauling of the Philippine social and economic structure.

The entrenched Nacionalista politicians, however, who represent the conservative, land-owning elite which has dominated every preceding administration, will resist any real challenge to the existing power structure. They control the congress and have maneuvered to influence key administrative appointments.

Magsaysay's new cabinet members were nearly all selected from a list of recommendations submitted by the party. He withdrew his original choice for labor secretary, and appointed to a key post in the Department of Foreign Affairs a protégé of Nacionalista stalwart Senator Claro Recto, who has often been critical of American policy. A woman appointed as social welfare administrator appears to have as her chief qualification that she is the daughter of a wealthy campaign contributor.

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The new secretary of commerce is a representative of the sugar interests. The latter financed Carlos Romulo's Democratic Party, which supported Magsaysay. Other appointees, however, appear to be well qualified and to have views similar to Magsaysay's.

The progressive groups which helped to organize Magsaysay's landslide victory have heretofore never been close to the inner circles of government. They include progressive Catholic groups and civic-minded business and professional organizations. Their members, some of whom are Magsaysay's closest advisers, are mostly young men of a different generation from that which dominated Philippine political life from Quezon to Quirino. In his short time in office, Magsaysay has apparently attempted to get along with his party and at the same time not to dim the hopes of these groups to which he must look for support of his program. So far he has been successful.

The Philippine Congress meets in regular session on 25 January. Philippine presidents have broad and powerful prerogatives which when skillfully used have enabled them to exercise virtually complete control over the legislative arm. Magsaysay, however, has none of the political experience of the Nacionalista leaders in Congress. He must move cautiously to avoid open conflict with them, but if he moves too cautiously he risks the considerable popular disillusionment which would follow a failure to live up to the high hopes he has raised.

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POST-STALIN SHAKE-UP IN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY

The extensive reorganization and personnel shake-up within the Soviet Foreign Ministry over the past ten months apparently is aimed at revitalizing Soviet diplomacy rather than purging political undesirables (see chart, p.18). The present regime is clearly interested in developing the Foreign Ministry as a more effective instrument of foreign policy than it appeared to be in Stalin's last years.

Almost 70 percent of the top Foreign Ministry positions have figured in personnel changes since Stalin died and V. M. Molotov resumed direct administrative control of the foreign affairs apparatus. This is the most extensive shake-up in the ministry since 1939, when Molotov became foreign minister the first time. In contrast to 1939, however, the present changes consist largely of personnel shifts within the ministry.

The relatively few individuals who have been brought in from other fields and assigned to leading positions are mostly high party men. These, added to the number of Foreign Ministry careerists already on top party bodies, place an unprecedented number of foreign service personnel high in the ranks of the party. Since the party has always maintained close control over the Foreign Ministry, the increased number of ministry personnel also on top party bodies lends support to the thesis that the party is now more actively interested in exploiting the traditional instrument of diplomacy as a means of effecting its foreign policy objectives.

The fact that most of the former party careerists in the foreign service are being utilized in Satellite affairs may indicate an attempt at closer control over the Orbit; but a more probable reason is that their experience will be most useful where similar ideological and organizational problems may be encountered and where ordinary diplomacy is less a problem.

In addition to the personnel shifts, the Foreign Ministry's central apparatus has been streamlined. Evidence indicates that the number of territorial divisions has been reduced from twelve to nine. A new American Division has been formed through the merger of the former Latin American and USA divisions. The Fifth European Division has been abolished and its territorial responsibility transferred to the Third European. There is a strong possibility, also, that the Balkan Countries Division has been abolished and its responsibilities assumed by the Fourth European.

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Soviet diplomatic relations with several foreign states have been regularized within the past ten months through the accrediting of ambassadors to Canada, Greece and Yugoslavia, where the Soviet embassies had been headed by chargés for several years. In addition, embassies were established and ambassadors accredited in Austria and the German Democratic Republic, and diplomatic relations with Israel were resumed. The latest move of this nature was the announcement on 22 December of the intention to establish an embassy in Indonesia, which the USSR recognized in 1950.

Taken all together, the large number of personnel shifts, the influx of top party people, the streamlining of the central apparatus, and the regularization of relations with foreign states add up to an attempt to increase the ministry's effectiveness in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations.

PROBABLE SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS

(only countries with which the USSR has diplomatic relations are included)

BEFORE STALIN'S DEATH

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1954

United Nations

United Nations

USA

Latin America

(Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay)

American countries

(USA, Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay)

1st European

(Benelux countries, France, Switzerland and Italy)

1st European

(unchanged)

2nd European

(Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)

2nd European

(unchanged)

3rd European

(Austria, Germany)

3rd European

(Austria, Germany, Scandinavian countries and Finland)

4th European

(Czechoslovakia, Poland)

4th European (except GDR)

(European Satellites, Greece and Yugoslavia)

5th European

(Scandinavian Countries and Finland)

Merged in 3rd European

Balkan Countries

(Hungary and Balkan Countries)

Merged in 4th European

Near & Middle East

(Ethiopia, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan)

Near & Middle East

(unchanged)

Southeast Asia

(Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia)

Southeast Asia

(unchanged)

1st Far Eastern

(Mongolia, China, Korea)

Far Eastern

(Mongolia, China, Korea)

SPECIAL ARTICLE

A SOVIET SURVEY: I. FOREIGN POLICY*

The outstanding characteristic of Soviet foreign policy from the summer of 1953 to the eve of the Berlin meeting has been a clear effort to temporize on every major East-West difference, steadfastly refusing to settle any of these differences at the cost of major concessions. The Soviet leaders thus have avoided unnecessary commitments which might reduce their future freedom of action.

This stand probably derives from two basic considerations. The first is Moscow's determination to maintain intact the present frontiers of the Orbit which compels it to reject all Western proposals for settlements requiring a possible withdrawal from such advanced positions as East Germany, Austria, and North Korea. The Soviet leaders are aware that this unyielding stand places them at a propaganda disadvantage in negotiating with the West. In order to offset this disadvantage, the Soviet representative at the forthcoming Berlin conference may attempt to avoid openly opposing those Western proposals which will command wide popular support, such as free elections in Germany, by means of injecting demands for a five-power conference and consideration of such issues as American foreign bases, international tensions, atomic weapons prohibition, and European security.

The second basic consideration is Moscow's probable belief that the present world stalemate can be maintained without serious disadvantage to Orbit interests and with growing prospects for an eventual split in the non-Communist world.

There have been no decisive changes in the Orbit which would impel Moscow to consider negotiating either a general settlement with the West or definitive agreements on specific questions. The concession on the POW issue which opened the way to the Korean armistice has been the only notable one which Orbit leaders have made.

* This is the first of two articles. The second will deal with internal problems.

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The policy of postponement may be partly motivated in certain areas by a desire to gain time for correcting the adverse effects of past policies, such as the pressing need to repair the damage to Soviet prestige inflicted by the June riots in East Germany. The new leadership may also have regarded the series of moves initiated after Stalin's death as the necessary forerunners of the internal economic and political readjustments they wished to introduce.

However, the over-all pattern of Soviet moves and propaganda in the international sphere suggests that this policy of postponement has been devised in the light of the Kremlin's present strategic estimate of its position vis-a-vis the non-Communist world. It appears, moreover, at least since the concessions on Korea and with the exception of certain temporary tactical retreats, that Soviet foreign policy is free from any basically defensive motivation springing either from internal weakness or from fear of Western intentions and military pressure.

The USSR is taking advantage of the period of stalemate to strengthen its position in areas which the Soviet leaders may believe are now vulnerable to Western pressure. In particular, Moscow moved quickly and vigorously both to restore the authority and prestige of the East German regime following the June riots, and to speed the reconstruction of North Korea's industry and communications and the reorganization of its armed forces.

The new regime has shown an awareness of the delicate problems presented by Mao Tse-tung's unique stature in the Communist world and Peiping's special and recently enhanced position in the Soviet Orbit. It has also taken steps to deal with these problems and maintain the solidarity of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In recent months Moscow has played up Communist China as a "new great power," has accorded China greater stature as an Asian model and leader, has given Mao unusual praise, has promised long-range assistance to Peiping's construction efforts, and has most recently acquiesced to increased Chinese influence in North Korea.

The present policy appears to rest basically on Moscow's belief that with the end of the Korean war, increasing pressure will be brought against the United States by its allies for a relaxation of trade controls, great power negotiations, and delays in rearmament and in European integration. The USSR apparently hopes that such pressures and frictions will progressively reduce the West's capability for united action.

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This strategy was clearly defined by Malenkov on 8 August 1953 when he said, "If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration."

There was nothing in this speech which would indicate any impending changes in the present pattern of Soviet foreign policy. Malenkov served notice that the present Soviet power position and the frontiers of the Orbit will be defended. He devoted special attention to countering any tendency in the West to interpret the "peace-through-negotiations" line as a manifestation of weakness. This was apparent in his hydrogen bomb claim and his references to the Beria purge and the current unrest in the Satellites.

The "campaign for negotiations" was the predominant feature of Soviet official statements and propaganda for the first six months of the new regime. It differed from previous propaganda offensives, such as the 1950 Stockholm appeal for a ban on atomic weapons and the 1951-52 appeal for a five-power peace pact, in that it was supported by concrete diplomatic moves. Malenkov's statement on 15 March 1953, repeated in his 8 August speech, that "there is not a single controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries" was the pivotal slogan of the campaign.

Moscow made most of its conciliatory gestures and concessions during the first four months after Stalin's death. More recently, the USSR has been calling on foreign governments to meet it halfway, and Soviet propaganda is making much less use of the theme of negotiated settlement of international issues.

In the course of the last six months, constant Western diplomatic pressure aimed at forcing Moscow to abandon its vague and generalized statements and to agree to serious negotiations on concrete issues greatly reduced the Kremlin's freedom of maneuver. This situation was registered in the note of 3 November 1953 which made clear the Soviet leaders' strong desire to avoid meeting with the three Western powers and their unwillingness to settle any major East-West issue at the cost of concessions involving the present frontiers of the Orbit.

This negative and inflexible stand produced a prompt and unfavorable Western reaction. Molotov's unusual press conference on 13 November apparently was an attempt to counteract such unfavorable comment, but he reiterated the note's unacceptable

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conditions. This was followed by the 26 November note which proposed a four-power foreign ministers' conference in Berlin and the 26 December note suggesting the 25 January 1954 date. This tactical change probably represented an effort to repair the damage to Moscow's propaganda position without, however, modifying any basic substantive positions.

The four Soviet notes which preceded that of 26 November clearly indicated that the USSR does not desire serious negotiations for a German settlement, except on its own terms, and then only in conjunction with five-power talks on "urgent international problems having great significance for the lessening of international tension."

The USSR refused to attend a meeting of foreign ministers' deputies on the Austrian state treaty and appeared reluctant to include this question on the agenda of a foreign ministers' conference. Soviet statements have suggested that the conclusion of an Austrian treaty is linked with the settlement of the German question.

With respect to a Korean settlement, so long as the Orbit leaders see no real danger of a resumption of hostilities, they probably calculate that little will be lost by maintaining the present deadlock and the division of Korea.

Indochina provides another example of the attempt to undermine non-Communist resistance to Communist pressure by exploiting hope of settling disputes through negotiation. Ho Chi Minh's 29 November statement that he is "prepared to discuss" a proposal from France for a settlement was probably aimed at generating doubt and suspicion in the minds of non-Communist Vietnamese, and at exploiting war-weariness in France. Ho's move probably was intended to complement Soviet efforts to induce France to pursue an "independent" foreign policy.

There is no convincing evidence that the Viet Minh urgently desires the prompt conclusion of a negotiated settlement. It is likely that Orbit policy will continue in the immediate future to be based on the belief that war of attrition in Indochina offers greater advantages than either peace or an expanded Communist war effort.

Moscow's policy of stalling for time and avoiding commitments has also emerged in its reaction to high-level suggestions from the West that the Soviet fear of attack might be relieved by some type of nonaggression pact. The USSR has strongly implied that no European security negotiations could take place unless Soviet terms on Germany are met.

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There have been several indications that the Soviet Union will develop the security theme at the Berlin conference, but the propaganda emphasis is likely to be placed on the dangers emanating from American foreign bases and "aggressive" alliances. Any proposals offered as an alternative to Western security arrangements are not likely to go beyond a Soviet-sponsored system of bilateral or multilateral security pacts which would be intended to supersede the EDC.

In another field, Moscow's affirmative response to President Eisenhower's widely acclaimed invitation to "governments principally concerned" to discuss his proposal for an international atomic energy pool reflected an awareness that outright refusal or delay would seriously damage its propaganda position. Soviet propaganda has since attempted to utilize the President's proposal to intensify the campaign for "an unconditional pledge by governments not to use atomic weapons."

The present Soviet foreign policy may be no more than a device for stalling in the belief that the bloc's over-all position will grow stronger and its freedom of maneuver greater with the passage of time. As such, it would be part of the campaign to isolate the United States by persuading the rest of the world that only American intransigence and aggressive ambitions thwart the establishment of secure peace. Moscow may hope that this campaign will open the way to bilateral negotiations aimed at detaching certain countries from the American-led coalition. The recent overture to France offering an alternative to the NATO alignment as a means of preventing the renascence of German military power is a case in point.

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